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The debate concerning job competition between immigrant and nonimmigrant groups
has intensified owing to the large increase in the 1970s and 1980s in immigration and
the simultaneous growth in urban poverty rates for African-American and other minority
groups. Itfocuses on the possible wage and displacement effects an increase in immigra-
tion would cause for the U.S. -born population. Using 1970 and 1980 industrial and
occupational census data and shift-share methodologyfor Los Angeles, the author
shows that immigrants do not simplyfunction as either competitive or complementary
sources of labor. Instead, he argues, job competition between groups of workers depends
in part on whether U.S. -born workers belong to protected or unprotected labor markets.
Overall, the data in this study reveal that immigrants are not displacing native-born
labor in disproportionate numbers, especially in industries. However, there are isolated
instances ofjob displacement between immigrants and native-born whites and Mexicans
in some occupations. In addition, complementarity (e.g., job growth) is more frequent
than displacement in industries and occupations, and decreases in white employment are
not the net result of immigrant employment growth in Los Angeles.
The influx of Latino and Asian immigrants to Southern California has transformed
the region's demographic composition; the changing population has redefined
the meaning of race relations, particularly as it pertains to labor-market issues facing
minority groups. This is a more nuanced and complicated framework, encompassing
multiracial and ethnic configurations and new forms of conflicts among minorities,
and certainly between majority and minority groups. Economic conflict has become a
source of tension among different factions, aiding a conservative backlash against civil
rights and a nativist movement bent on stopping immigration. Perhaps the most vol-
atile and contentious factor in this conflict is the notion of job competition among vari-
ous groups of low-skilled workers, usually between an immigrant and a U.S.-born
minority group.
The notion of job displacement of native-born workers by foreigners is one of the
most emotionally polarized debates surrounding issues of immigration to the United
States. This fear fluctuates with national and regional economic cycles, particularly those
of high immigrant population states such as California and New York. Since 1 965 the
large wave of immigration to this country has been blamed for increases in
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'Present industrial policy or lack thereof serves as a magnet
for cheap immigrant labor. The continued demandfor cheap
labor not only attracts immigrant labor, legal or otherwise,
but also serves as a catalystfor poor labor-market conditions
that in turn are more conducive to job competition between
immigrants and other marginalized workers"
— Abel Valenzuela, Jr.
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American urban poverty, particularly to the growth of its urban underclass and the high
jobless rate of African-Americans. 1 While the contemporary and popular interest in
immigration stems from a growing nativist backlash and rises in ethnic conflict, its per-
ceived contribution to the increasing rates of poverty during the past two decades and
effect on the composition and location of the poor are equally compelling. 2 3
As research on poverty and the underclass has expanded, studies, and especially poli-
cies of immigration, have multiplied.
4 This increased attention is also attributable to the
large influx of legal and illegal immigrants during the past two decades. 5 Students of
immigration are interested in understanding the causes and consequences of international
migration, the assimilation and integration of immigrants into society generally and labor
markets in particular, and the possible economic impact that immigrants may have on
earnings, employment, and welfare expenditures. These issues are at the forefront of U.S.
immigration research because of two other important factors, namely, the composition
and geographic location of the "new immigration."67 Because the country-of-origin com-
position of immigrants has changed from European to Asian and Latin American stock,
and immigrants continue to concentrate in urban centers, concern over their economic
impact has increased. Congruent with this change is speculation that the skills composi-
tion of recent immigrants is lower than that of earlier waves and, as a result, contributes
to worsened labor-market opportunities and job competition with other low-skilled immi-
grants and minorities in inner cities. 8
Given the increase in urban poverty, the underclass, and immigration during the
1970s and 1980s, two questions emerge: Are these phenomena related to each other?
If so, how are they related? More specifically, does the increase in low-skilled immi-
grants worsen labor-market opportunities for native underclass residents? If opportuni-
ties are curtailed and native workers are being displaced by immigrants, is this displace-
ment related to the formation of an urban underclass, and if so, how?
This article analyzes the relationship between the labor-market concentration of
Mexican, Latino, and Asian immigrants and the employment opportunities of U.S.-born
white, black, and Mexican workers in Los Angeles from 1970 to 1980. 1 address the
question of whether native workers are adversely affected by the industrial and occupa-
tional concentration of immigrants and whether this contributes to the emergence
of a Latino and black underclass. My study departs from a conventional analysis of
immigrant and native-born labor-market competition in that I analyze shifts in industry
concentration of immigrants after controlling for the size of competing labor pools
and the growth in each industry in a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA).
Past studies assessing the economic well-being of immigrants and their impact on U.S.-
born labor are based on national samples that inadequately examine economic integra-
tion processes in regional or local areas. Because immigrants tend disproportionately
to settle in certain parts of the country, regional and local impacts are significant in
understanding labor-market changes. This study, by focusing on one region, specific
industries and occupations, and particular samples of racial and ethnic groups, reveals
several dimensions of job competition offering new insights into the labor-market
impacts of immigration.
In addition, my study is important to the underclass literature for several reasons.
Evidence that immigrants curtail the employment opportunities of U.S.-born workers,
particularly U.S.-born Mexicans and such other minority groups as African-Americans,
addresses a major issue in the underclass literature: whether job opportunities for
African-Americans and other minorities have lessened over the course of the decade as
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a result of immigration. Minority U.S.-born laborers, particularly African-Americans,
have increasingly experienced worsening labor-market opportunities. Black unemploy-
ment increased steadily from 9.8 percent in 1974 to 1 1.4 percent in 1979 to 16.4
percent in 1984. The labor-force participation rate of African-Americans also has shown
a steady decline between these years, from 72.9 percent in 1974 to 71.3 percent in
1979, to 70.8 percent, respectively.
9
If immigrant labor can be substituted for U.S.-born
labor, immigrants may be reducing the wages of minority and other native labor,
increasing American unemployment, and lowering labor-force participation. If, however,
evidence suggests that immigrants do not function simply as competitive substitute
sources of labor, other explanations for declining job opportunities for domestic labor
will be necessary.
Job Competition: Old Question, New Context
Historically, there has always been nativist concern over job competition between immi-
grants and U.S.-born labor; immigrants were blamed for the country's worsening
economies during the 1930s, 1950s, and 1970s. The concern that immigrants are dis-
placing American workers has once again become an extremely volatile topic in
California and other states and cities with immigrant concentrations. As U.S. economic
fortunes continue to deteriorate and jobs become scarce or shift into part-time or poorly
paid service occupations, immigrants become easy prey for shifts in joblessness among
U.S.-born workers. The overtones of today's debate, which seems to be driven by emo-
tion, fear, xenophobia, and politics, are strikingly similar to those of the past. A plethora
of actors, from California's Governor Pete Wilson, to journalists, advocacy groups such
as the Federation for American Immigration Reform, and state- and city-sponsored
reports, have contributed to this fear. 10 However, the present debate on job competition
takes on new overtones because it singles out African-Americans and other native-born
minority groups as the primary victims of immigration's "negative costs" in the form of
fewer jobs, reduced services, and a lower quality of life.
Theories on the Impacts of Immigration
The debate over the effects of immigration on the U.S. labor market has lasted almost
sixty years, since the U.S. Immigration Commission concluded in 1935 that "immigra-
tion was responsible for many of the poor working conditions then evident in the United
States."
11 Two major theories describe immigrants' participation in and economic effects
on the U.S. labor market, commonly known as the displacement and segmentation
hypotheses. Paradoxically, they make opposite assumptions about the labor market and
hence reach disparate conclusions about the impact of immigrant labor.
In general, the neoclassical displacement hypothesis argues that immigrants arrive in
the United States in the face of declining wages. An increased supply of foreign work-
ers, in turn, further pushes domestic wages down by expanding the aggregate supply
despite a stable demand for labor. Immigrants displace native-born workers because the
former are assumed to be perfect substitutes for the latter and skill differences are
ignored. 12
The segmentation theory, on the other hand, argues that the U.S. labor market is suffi-
ciently divided between immigrant and nonimmigrant jobs to insulate domestic workers
from direct displacement effects by migrants. 13 Proponents of this theory argue that immi-
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grants are hired into a low-wage sector of the labor market where few nonimmigrants are
employed, owing partly to differences in skill. Native workers, likewise, may be
employed in unskilled jobs but are nevertheless protected from job competition because
their jobs may be covered by union contracts, an institutional barrier that prevents the
employment of immigrant workers. Under this view, immigrant and domestic labor may
complement each other in different sectors of the economy.
Related to the segmentation hypothesis is the argument that immigrants take jobs that
native workers no longer want; that is, a job ladder, or queue, for immigrant workers
exists. Over time, U.S.-born laborers move on to better occupations, vacating "lower-
rung" and less desirable jobs that various groups of newcomers then fill. Once hired,
immigrants employ social networks to recruit other immigrants and, in this way, certain
industries become reserved exclusively for them. 14 Employers also have a queue in
which certain groups may be preferred over others. In this instance, immigrants may be
valued more than black or other U.S. -born labor, perhaps because the former are per-
ceived as harder working, cheaper, and more docile than the latter. To the extent that
such a queue is developing in secondary occupations or peripheral industries in which
immigrants and other disadvantaged groups are concentrated, immigrants may work at
the expense of black or U.S. -born labor.
Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence on the market impact of increased immigration on native labor
can be divided into three categories: production function models that estimate across
national samples of individuals; industrial and occupational sectoral studies that employ
large numbers of immigrants; and analyses of labor-market outcomes across regions or
SMSAs, which contain a large number of immigrants.
Production Function Models on National Samples
Production function models determine the relationship between the output of goods —
wages or employment — and relevant inputs — factors of production such as immigrant
labor. Econometric research based on production function models has attempted to esti-
mate the aggregate effect of immigration on natives' wages. Based on the conclusion of
several researchers in this field, the aggregate negative effect of increases in the supply
of immigrants on the earnings and employment of natives is either small or nonexistent
and mostly falls on other recent immigrants. 15
Borjas, in a series of studies, concludes that immigrants have minimal, if any, ad-
verse impact on the wage rates, earnings, and participation rates of different groups
of native workers. 16 For example, he estimates, in one study using multivariate analysis,
that male migration increased the earnings of both young and older black males in
1970. 17 A similar estimate for 1980 also provided no statistically significant evidence
that black male earnings were reduced either by recent or past immigration. Here, immi-
grants appear to be complementing the black labor force.
Rivera-Batiz, Sechzer, and Grang, using a translog production function model, argue
that, depending on the amount of skills, education, and experience a person commands,
a "disturbance in the rates of return to these three inputs will result in a change in
wages." 18 Thus, an influx of immigrants affects the native-born by changing the returns
to education, experience, and skills. In another study, Borjas argues that immigrants tend
to be substitutes for low-skilled native labor and complements for high-skilled natives. 19
Based on labor demand elasticity's and regression analysis, he asserts that any negative
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effect immigrants may have on natives, if any, is negligible and may at most have a
slight impact on earlier immigrants. For example, Borjas asserts that a 10 percent
increase in immigration appears to decrease the wages of residents born abroad by be-
tween 2 and 9 percent. 20 In a similar study, Stewart and Hyclak, using data for cen-
tral cities of the largest U.S. SMSAs in 1970, examine the effects of recent immigrants
(ten or fewer years) on the relative earnings of black males in comparison with white
males. 21 They find some degree of substitutability between black males and recent immi-
grants from countries other than Mexico, Cuba, and the West Indies. According to
this study, if any competition takes place between immigrants and domestic laborers, it
occurs only with other minorities or recent immigrants of similar backgrounds.
Bean, Lowell, and Taylor extend Borjas's work to analyze the effects of illegal immi-
gration on the annual earnings of native workers. 22 They show that the undocumented
Mexican population has no depressive effect on the annual earnings of black males
or females and that legal Mexican immigrants and native Mexicans actually complement
blacks in the labor market.
Industrial and Occupational Sectoral Studies
Sectoral studies examine the relationships between immigrant and native workers in par-
ticular labor markets rather than throughout the nation as a whole. A few of these
studies focus on the impact of immigration on the employment and earnings of natives.
Studies that address this issue rely on census data or are based on specific case studies.
It is important to review research on specific industrial and occupational labor markets
to see if these studies corroborate or negate existing aggregate multivariate analysis
on immigration impact and the case studies reveal factors not captured in multivariate
studies. The following is a brief summary of the literature in a few selected industries
and occupations in which immigrants are concentrated. Based on this review of the liter-
ature, I conclude that the effects of immigration on U.S. workers, specifically in indus-
tries and occupations with a large number of immigrants, are varied.
Agriculture is one of the most thoroughly researched industries in sectoral studies of
immigration and labor markets, probably because of its historical reliance on cheap
labor and its appeal to immigrant labor, legal and illegal. Most of these studies evaluate
immigration effects on particular crops and regions. One study concludes that the loss of
immigrant workers leads to an increase in crop prices insofar as native labor is unwilling
to perform agricultural labor at immigrant wages. 23
De Frietas and De Frietas and Marshall claim that heavy concentrations of immigrant
labor affect the wages of less-skilled workers in manufacturing. 24 They conclude
that in industries with concentrations of immigrants exceeding 20 percent, a one percent
increase in immigration results in about a 1.2 percent decrease in the rate of wage
growth. However, this evidence can also be interpreted differently. As immigrants
become absorbed or replace workers in the lower-paying occupational sectors, domestic
workers move to better-paying industries and occupations. Waldinger, in his study of
the garment industry in New York City, argues that "to some extent immigrants may
have displaced domestic workers, but [only] to the extent that complementary jobs were
available elsewhere."25 Thomas Bailey's analysis of New York City's restaurant industry
provides convincing evidence that immigrant men do not compete with native black
workers but may compete with other immigrants, specifically recently arrived women
and teenageis. 26 Research on the service industry indicates an increasing concentration
of immigrants in a variety of service sector occupations. 27 Based on interviews with
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more than a thousand Hispanic and black unemployed workers seeking positions
through two local Los Angeles service centers of the California Employment Develop-
ment Department, Maram and King conclude that more than 51 percent of the Hispanics
and blacks interviewed would be willing to work for lower wages than those presently
being paid in most service-sector occupations. 28 Thus, the authors conclude that the
downward pressure exerted by immigrants on the wages of current legal workers has
caused some job displacement.
Most industry studies on the impact of immigration are largely based on a qualitative
approach with some limited quantitative analysis. Those most affected by immigrants
seem to be earlier immigrant cohorts or low-skilled native workers employed in occupa-
tions and industries with high concentrations of women, teenagers, and minorities.
But these sectoral studies lack the explicit connection to other sectors in the economy
and cannot be taken as conclusive evidence regarding the impact of immigration on
native workers. Native workers may in some instances be moving to better-paying jobs,
as suggested by Waldinger and Maram and King. 29
The effects of immigration on specific industries and occupations seem to vary.
They depend on the size of the firm and its vitality, the type and market area of the
industry, and the skills and other characteristics of the immigrants. A large firm that
employs many workers in an area with a large surplus of immigrant laborers could easi-
ly exert downward wage pressures because immigrants would be willing to work for
less pay than natives. Likewise, a growing industry with strong internal labor markets
and a union presence would insulate native-born labor from any wage or employment
downswing as a result of increased immigration.
Regional and Metropolitan Studies
Regional and metropolitan studies focus on the local distribution of immigrants and
their aggregate effects on their location patterns, regional labor forces, and "immigrant
cities" such as Los Angeles and New York. These studies of immigration and its eco-
nomic impact fall into two broad categories: regional, which usually looks at four major
U.S. geographical areas — Northeast, North Central, South, and West— and metropoli-
tan, which examines several "immigrant" cities and their metropolitan areas — New
York, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and Chicago.
It is important to review this research because of immigration's uneven regional dis-
tribution and differences in economic development. Immigrants' uneven distribution
probably means that their regional economic effects will also vary. Moreover, their dis-
tribution may be influenced by patterns of regional economic development. For exam-
ple, it is no coincidence that the growth of immigration to Los Angeles during 1970 and
1980 occurred during a time when the city was experiencing manufacturing growth. In
addition, the geographic distribution of the foreign born is shifting toward the Sunbelt
and the West, areas that also have sustained economic growth.
Data about the regional distribution and characteristics of immigration provide a
recent, yet preliminary, picture of immigrants in labor markets. Immigrants contribute to
regional labor forces differently. For example, 20 percent of the West's overall labor-
force growth between 1 970 and 1 980 came through immigration. This pattern differs
from the Northeast (13%), the South (9%), and the North Central region (4%).
Immigrants' labor-force characteristics, such as occupational concentration, human capi-
tal characteristics, labor-force participation, and earnings, also differ significantly by
region. For example, Lowell, using census data for 1970 and 1980 by region, shows how
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Mexican-origin migrants tend to have lower human capital characteristics — education,
skills, job experience—than other foreign-born persons, particularly Asians, in the
West. 30 Lowell also shows that time of arrival is correlated with human capital character-
istics and variations in occupational concentration and earnings. 31 For example, half of
all immigrants in the West arrived since 1970, meaning that they, on average, have
fewer years in the labor market than the native born. Immigrants in the West are also
younger, less likely to complete high school, and less apt to speak English than the
native born.
32 But what do these differences signify in regard to a regional economic
impact on native wages and employment?
New York City, the gateway for many of our nation's immigrants, is a rich source of
research on the roles of immigrants in metropolitan labor markets. Some of the major
works on New York include Waldinger and Lapp, Bailey and Waldinger, and Sassen,
Waldinger, and Bailey. 33 They provide an assortment of data that for the most part fo-
cuses on immigrant economic mobility as a result of industrial restructuring rather than
on the specific impact of immigrants on native workers' job opportunities. Immigration
research on Chicago, as on New York, has for the most part addressed the issue of group
mobility and industrial restructuring. 34 Studies on Miami focus on the Cuban enclave as
an example of largely self-contained social and economic environments that provide for
successful mobility patterns and labor market integration. 35 Research on Los Angeles
suggests that immigrants have a negative effect on wages in selected low-skill indus-
tries.
36 This effect is primarily concentrated on Hispanic recent arrivals with similar edu-
cation, skills, age, sex, and ethnic-origin characteristics. 37
Two broad conclusions emerge from regional and metropolitan studies: the economic
effects of immigration on natives, regionally, are small and metropolitan studies
suggest that some level of displacement occurs in several low-skill occupations and
between earlier and later immigrant groups that share similar human-capital and job
qualifications.
When analyzed separately or as a whole, production function models, sectoral, and
regional and metropolitan studies provide us with some answers as to the overall eco-
nomic impact immigrants have on native earnings and employment. It is generally not
adverse, though immigration may result in slight wage depression and displacement for
some groups of workers. 38 Immigrants also expand employment opportunities for com-
plementary workers. 39
The displacement and segmentation hypotheses propose an either-or situation that
does not correspond to available empirical evidence. The issue then becomes,
Under what circumstances does displacement occur and under what circumstances
does it not? The key to further specifying immigrant impact on natives is to doc-
ument in greater detail which groups of workers and industries and occupations are
affected. A more thorough analysis of the economic impacts of increased immi-
gration depends on numerous factors, including the following: the size and composition
of the domestic labor supply; the education, experience, and other human capital char-
acteristics of immigrants; the growth or decline of the firm or industrial segment
in which immigrants are employed; the race, ethnicity, and gender of immigrants; the
regional and metropolitan location of the industrial segment; and the protected or unpro-
tected nature of the labor markets in which immigrants work. The impact of immi-
grants on the domestic labor force is largely mediated by regional, occupational, and
industrial change. A more complete examination must incorporate the changing occupa-
tional and industrial structure into labor-market analysis.
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Research Method
In undertaking this study I compiled data on Los Angeles showing the extent of immi-
grant and native concentration in industrial and occupational labor markets. To test for
actual competition between groups of workers, I adapted Waldinger's shift-share model
and applied it to industries and occupations categorized according to three different
typologies or tests, which are explained below.40 Using shift-share allows me to test fac-
tors contributing to industrial and occupational employment changes between two time
periods.
Waldinger first applied this method to measuring employment differentials between
several racial and ethnic immigrant and U.S.-born groups in New York during 1970
and 1980.41 He found that the composition of the workforce is a crucial factor in the
occupational position of nonwhites, and changes in the size of the white population set
the stage for an upward realignment of nonwhite workers. New York's economic shift
from goods to services was primarily responsible for the decline in the availability
of white workers who left for better-paying jobs in outlying areas, which in turn created
a replacement demand for nonwhite workers; that is, a process of job succession or
"musical chairs," in which immigrants replace departing white labor, took place in New
York during the 1970s.42 Waldinger concludes by suggesting that the impact of compo-
sitional change was blunted by a trend toward ethnic competition, as reflected in a
declining employment total and share for U.S.-born blacks.
Waldinger's study analyzed only eleven major industrial categories. 43 Such a broad,
aggregated study may mask important differences in the employment of immigrant
and U.S.-born workers in industries and occupations that are not aggregated or analyzed
as one regional economy. Thus, my research expands on Waldinger's by disaggre-
gating industrial categories according to whether they are at the core or periphery and
are experiencing growth or decline. In addition, I apply this method to occupations
organized according to fifteen broad categories and four occupational segments — for
example, independent primary, craft, subordinate primary, and secondary.44
Shift-share allows me to analyze for any given region whether the number of immi-
grants, when compared with other groups in the same labor markets, grew or declined
over time in industrial and occupational concentration as a result of changes in the
relative size of the labor supply of different ethnic groups; changes in the size of an
industry or occupation — industry/occupation effect; and changes in a group's employ-
ment in an industry or occupation net of group size and industry/occupation effect.
This last variable reflects the extent to which a group is concentrating or "deconcentrat-
ing" in a specific labor market. 45 Adding group size and industry/occupation change
reveals whether the two factors undercut or reinforce the trends to concentrate or decon-
centrate in a particular industry or occupation.
A positive figure in share represents an increasing group share of all industries/occu-
pations in a particular sector. For example, if a particular immigrant group in an in-
dustry or occupation shows a positive total group share, it is being employed in that sec-
tor at rates higher than those at which it is entering other sectors and is thus becoming
more concentrated in that sector. A negative share signifies the opposite; that is, a partic-
ular group is entering that sector at rates lower than those at which it is entering other
sectors and is becoming less concentrated or deconcentrated. 46
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Job Competition
This research is primarily concerned with the displacement of U.S.-born workers in
industries and occupations owing to an increase in the supply of immigrant labor. More
specifically, I assess the employment shares of three native groups — whites, African-
Americans, and Mexicans — to see how they respond to changes in the employment
47
share of three immigrant groups — Mexicans, Latinos, and Asians. After I analyzed the
results of the model, five possible job competition patterns emerged. These patterns dis-
tinguish between various job competition scenarios that are not easily identifiable or
clear cut when analyzed only as raw shift-share results, that is, absolute figures.
Therefore, each native group in every industrial and occupational category is analyzed
and coded with one of these five possible patterns to correspond to the model results as
follows:
• Complete Displacement (CD) takes place when all native groups lose jobs while all
immigrant groups gain.
• Displacement (D) occurs when some native groups and some immigrant groups
lose jobs in the same industry during the same time period. Because both native and
immigrant groups are losing jobs, I attribute this pattern to factors other than immi-
gration, such as industrial restructuring.
• Partial Displacement (PD) happens when one or two native groups lose jobs while
one or two immigrant groups gain. In this pattern, particular attention is paid to
the native Mexican group, because it is a closer substitute for the immigrant groups
analyzed here and consequently may be especially vulnerable to displacement.
• Complete Complementarity (CC) occurs when native groups gain jobs simultane-
ously with all three immigrant groups' gains. The gain in native and immigrant
jobs is a factor not only of increases in immigration but also of industrial growth,
a robust economy, and other structural factors.
• Native Complementarity (NC) takes place when native groups gain jobs while
immigrant groups lose.
Research Data
Recent immigrants comprise a small proportion of the U.S. population at any given
time. The data set I utilized had to be large enough to include the different subpopula-
tions by race, ethnicity, and gender among native-born and foreign-born Angelenos.
In addition, the data set had to be comparable between two time periods, 1970 and 1980,
to assess shifts in the labor market resulting from immigration. The best data for this
task are the Public Use Sample (PUS) of the 1970 census and the Public Use Mi-crodata
Sample (PUMS) of the 1980 census. These data are large stratified samples of housing
units enumerated in the U.S. census; they contain sociodemographic information on
housing units — household records — and each person residing within them — person
records. Specifically, I gathered my data from the one percent sample of the PUS
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Table J
Industrial Change by Core and Periphery, Los Angeles 1970-1980










































Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 and 1980 Public Use Microdata Samples.
from the 1970 census and the 5 percent sample of the PUMS from the 1980 census. The




Industrial Repositioning (Test 1)
As Table 1 shows, between 1970 and 1980 total employment for Los Angeles grew by
more than 349,960 jobs, a 9 percent increase. A large portion of this increase came from
the growth of the health, education, finance, insurance and real estate, and business
industries, which together accounted for more than two-thirds of the total growth rate.
There was also substantial growth in the restaurant, apparel, high-technology, transporta-
tion, and public administration industries. However, Los Angeles also experienced major
losses in several industries, for example, personal services, miscellaneous manufactur-
ing, air and ordnance, and specialty retail stores.
The core and periphery for this region grew at 1 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively.
In the periphery, major losses were experienced by the miscellaneous manufacturing,
utilities and sanitation, specialty retail, personal service, and domestic service industries.
However, these losses were offset by large increases in the business, entertainment and
recreation, apparel, and eating and drinking establishment industries. When the total in-
dustrial population is divided according to nativity, an interesting trend emerges. Immi-
grants show no losses in their industrial employment in the periphery and two insignifi-
cant losses in the core, in tobacco manufacturing and in rail service. Indeed, in those
industries which experienced losses, they were felt almost exclusively by the U.S.-born
laborer.
When I further divided industrial data by race and ethnicity for 1970 and 1980,
whites were the primary losers in both the core and periphery.49 Blacks also suffered job
losses in several industries in the core and periphery but in much fewer numbers and
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Table 2
Changes in Industrial Employment
for Selected Ethnic Groups,
Los Angeles, 1970-1980
Employment Job Change
Groups in Actual Act-E/
Core Industries 1970 1980 Expected Actual Expected 1970 Emp.
NB White 1,615,200 1,452,280 209,976 -162,920 -372,896 -23.09%
NB Black 205,400 316,860 26,702 111,460 84,758 41.26%
NB Mexican 141,700 200,320 18,421 58,620 40,199 28.37%
FB Mexican 64,500 188,640 8,385 124,140 115,755 179.47%
FB Latino 32,000 71,100 4,160 39,100 34,940 109.19%
FB Asian 19,500 103,420 2,535 83,920 81,385 417.36%
Groups in
Periphery Industries
NB White 1,060,500 840,160 21,210 -220,340 -241,550 -22.78%
NB Black 156,600 147,180 3,132 -9,420 -12,552 -8.02%
NB Mexican 99,300 114,660 1,986 15,360 13,374 13.47%
FB Mexican 74,400 210,620 1,488 136,220 134,732 181.09%
FB Latino 30,600 74,640 612 44,040 43,428 141.92%
FB Asian 22,200 70,880 444 48,680 48,236 217.28%
Source: My estimates are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1970 PUS (1%) and 1980 PUMS (5%,
sample) files.
Note: NB = native-born, FB = foreign-born.
as a lower percentage of total loss per industry. Latinos and Asians, on the other hand,
showed large job gains.
Table 2 organizes the population according to five racial and ethnic groups and shows
the number of industrial jobs per sector held by each group in Los Angeles in 1 970 and
1980. Its fourth column shows the number of jobs each group would have gained had its
gains been proportional to the growth in the overall Los Angeles economy during this
period, when industrial employment grew by 9 percent, from 3,948,900 jobs in 1970 to
4,298,860 in 1980. Table 2 then indicates how many jobs the group actually gained or lost
and the difference between expected and actual employment losses.
This table allows us to glimpse the different dynamics affecting the process of job
change in Los Angeles during 1970 and 1980. Here we can see that the biggest losers of
jobs were whites, losing close to 400,000 jobs in the core and peripheral industries.
However, this loss is offset by the large job gain experienced by nonwhite groups, both
native and foreign born, in both sectors, providing Los Angeles with an overall job growth
rate of 9 percent. What accounts for the white job loss and the nonwhite job gain? Is job
competition, in the form of displacement between immigrants and nonimmigrants or
between whites and nonwhites, partly to blame for mostly white and some black loss? In
the following section I attempt to answer these questions.
To assess the impact of industrial and occupational compositional change, I used shift-
share analysis, classifying all 46 industries to dual labor-market theory (see note 44)
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Table 3
Immigrant Job Competition Patterns for













































to Immigration 16 0.35 19 0.41 15 0.33
Overall Complementarity 18 0.39 25 0.54 23 0.50
Total 46 1.00 46 1.00 46 1.00
Source: My estimates are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1970 PUS (1%) and 1980 (5%) files.
Note: Totals do not include overall displacement and overall complementarity.
and are listed according to Tolbert, Horan, and Beck's typology. 50 1 extend the authors'
matrix and further classify the industries according to those which grew and declined
between 1970 and 1980 per sector. In Los Angeles's core sector 18 industries grew and 9
declined, while in its periphery, 1 1 grew and 8 declined. These two patterns alone show
that during the 1970s, Los Angeles's economy, especially in the core sector, was quite
robust in terms of industrial change.
The share results show several combinations of both native and immigrant losses and
gains in industrial employment. These reflect different instances of displacement and
complementarity that, in part, are attributable to immigrant growth and other factors such
as industrial restructuring, the general economic climate, and other variables not tested in
this model. To make better sense of the share results and their implication for job compe-
tition, I coded different immigrant employment-share patterns that assist in identifying
industries in which job competition possibly is occurring between immigrant and native-
born workers. I coded the patterns for each industry which, unfortunately, provides few
recognizable patterns with which to analyze job competition. To ameliorate this problem,
I created summary Tables 3 and 4 showing job competition patterns according to indus-
trial change — growth and decline— for the three native-born groups at issue.
Does Competition Exist?
Table 3 provides a general summary of job competition patterns for the three native-born
groups in the core and peripheral sectors in Los Angeles. The data in the two columns
for each of these groups indicate the number of industries that fall into each job competi-
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tion pattern. The first column provides the actual number of industries that fall under one
of the five patterns, and the second column provides the percentage total of this figure.
The data in this table indicate that, indeed, both job displacement and complementar-
ity exist in Los Angeles. However, more industries show complementarity rather than
displacement for blacks and Mexicans, the two groups most vulnerable to job competi-
tion with immigrants because of their substitutability. Combining complete displacement
with partial displacement yields an overall displacement trend, and combining complete
complementarity and complementarity owing to immigrant job loss produces an overall
complementarity trend. 51 Comparing the job competition trends of overall displacement
with overall complementarity shows that immigrants complement native-born groups in
much larger proportions than they displace them. 52
Of particular note in Table 3 is pattern 5, which shows the number of industries in
which immigrant groups were displaced by native-born workers. This finding suggests
that, just as native-born workers are displaced as a result of increased immigration,
immigrants are displaced in particular industries as a result of native-born employment
gains. As the regional labor market fluctuates through cycles of growth and decline, dif-
ferent groups compete for different jobs, but displacement can harm either immigrants
or the native born.
Does Industrial Change Matter?
The second inquiry of this section is whether industrial change — growth or decline —
matters in stimulating or thwarting job competition. Table 4 lists the number of indus-
tries for each sector in which native-born workers were displaced or complemented by
the employment of immigrants; it also separates the displacement and complementarity
categories based on whether the industries grew or declined during the 1970s.
Industrial growth or decline may influence whether job displacement or complementari-
ty occurs in an industry. In declining industries, displacement is more likely than in a
robust growing industry.
In Los Angeles, more industries in the core grew — 18 of 27 — than declined, and
complementarity was more likely to occur in those industries which grew than in those
which declined. However, no clear patterns emerged to show that job displacement was
more prevalent in the declining industries and complementarity was concentrated in the
growth industries. This finding suggests that both instances of immigrant displacement
and complementarity occur, regardless of whether an industry is declining or growing.
Industrial change makes no difference in patterns of job competition caused by
increased immigration.
In general, this first test shows data to be inconclusive for blacks and Mexicans; that
is, I cannot conclude one way or the other that immigrants systematically displace or
complement black and Mexican workers in Los Angeles. Test 1 does not signify that
increases in immigration lead to the displacement of native-born labor. In fact, the only
group that experienced instances of displacement was the white population. However,
such displacement was concentrated only in the core. This finding is important because
it suggests that (1) displacement may be occurring in high-skill as opposed to low-skill
industries, contrary to what is usually argued, and (2) immigrants may be preferred over
or be close substitutes for whites in high-skill industries. In either case, job displacement
in industries is not occurring between immigrant and minority workers in Los Angeles.
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Table 4
Effect of Immigrant Job Competition Patterns
on Los Angeles Industries
Number of Number of Number of
Industries Industries Industries
Growth/Decline Patterns Affected Affected Affected
Core Industries
Displacement
Growth 12 8 9
Decline 4 5 5
Total 16 13 14
Complementarity
Growth 6 10 9
Decline 5 4 4
Total 77 14 13
Periphery Industries
Displacement
Growth 10 5 6
Decline 2 3 3
Total 12 8 9
Complementarity
Growth 1 6 5
Decline 6 5 5
Total 7 77 10
Source: My estimates are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1970 PUS (1%) and 1980 PUMS (5%) files.
Furthermore, the following findings suggest a higher incidence of complementarity to
the native born as a result of increased industrial employment of immigrants.
• Blacks and Mexicans had more industries (54% and 50%, respectively) with
instances of complementarity than whites (39%).
• Whites, blacks, and Mexicans gained in employment share in several industries
while immigrants lost in those same industries, suggesting that immigrants may
be losing in their industrial employment share as a result of native gain.
• Instances of immigrant displacement and complementarity occur regardless of
whether an industry is declining or growing. Industrial change makes no difference
in stratifying complementary or displacement effects of increased immigration.
Occupational Repositioning
The foregoing data indicate the extent of immigrant and native access to various sectors
of the economy, but they say little about the levels at which these workers are employed.
Here, I examine occupational repositioning for the same ethnic groups. I employ two
tests that correspond to two occupational typologies according to fifteen categories and
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four segments. I have chosen to look at fifteen census-defined broad categories divided
between growth and decline to assess, as in the previous test, whether occupational
change — growth and decline— makes a difference in stratifying occurrences of job
competition. The latter test divides all the census-defined occupations into four broad
categories — independent primary, craft, subordinate primary, and secondary; see note
44 for a description of job characteristics for each of these categories. The test's primary
purpose is to measure whether institutional barriers such as unions or credential (certifi-
cate) jobs make a difference in stratifying instances of job competition.
Between 1970 and 1980, the Los Angeles economy, like the national economy, shift-
ed from producing goods to services, resulting in expanded white-collar and service
occupations. Los Angeles showed a net growth of 350,000 jobs concentrated in the man-
agerial, sales, goods-producing, and service occupations.
Table 5 provides data on the number of jobs per occupation for the total populations
and by nativity. Immigrants gained in employment share in every occupation. Their
largest gains were concentrated in the semiskill, craft, and clerical occupations, which
coincidentally also had the largest employment losses for the native-born population.
Almost half a million immigrants gained in occupational employment while natives lost
more than 145,000 jobs.
An alternative method to classify occupations is by segmentation analysis. 54 The low-
er portion of Table 5 provides data on the number of jobs per occupational segment
for the total population and by nativity. As the data for the four occupational segments
show, the largest employer in 1970 was the subordinate primary, followed by the sec-
ondary, independent primary, and craft. This order changed in 1980, when the indepen-
dent primary became the second largest employer. During the 1970s, occupations that
are characterized in the subordinate primary declined by 2 percent. When disaggregated
by nativity, the data show that native workers experienced the largest loss of jobs in the
subordinate primary, secondary, and craft occupations. However, these losses were offset
by the large growth of immigrant employment in each of the four segments.
Similar to industries in Los Angeles, occupational growth was concentrated among
the immigrant and minority populations while whites and the natives showed a loss.
What can shift-share methodology tell us about the occupational employment change for
these population groups? Is competition a factor in white and native occupational job
loss? In the following section I attempt to answer these two questions.
Shift-Share Model, Fifteen Categories (Test 2)
Data for changes in occupational employment for the total population in Los Angeles and
for each ethnic group show that U.S.-born whites suffered significant job loss in Los
Angeles while the other racial and ethnic groups offset that loss by phenomenal growth.
These latter groups exceeded the expected job growth rate, in some cases by over 2,000
percent! These data reveal a different set of dynamics affecting the process of job change
and concentration. As the Los Angeles economy grew, it absorbed large numbers of immi-
grants, mostly in the services and some white-collar jobs. White employment declined for
the same reasons cited in an earlier study of New York City by Waldinger: the decline in
white employment there was caused primarily by the older age, higher death rate, lower
birthrate, and greater outmigration to the suburbs or other regions of the United States of
whites in comparison with nonwhites. 56 In addition, Waldinger notes that a large cohort of
European immigrants who arrived between 1900 and 1915 reached retirement age during
the 1970s.
57
1 address the extent and type of occupational job competition.
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Table 5
Occupational Change in Los Angeles, 1970-1980 by Total
Employment, Nativity, and Segments
(in thousands)
Total Employment Nativity
1970 1980 Change % Chg.
Immigrant U.S. Born
Occupations 1970 1980 Change 1970 1980 Change
Management &
administration 308 460 152 .49 37 79 42 271 380 109
Professional 604 646 42 .07 66 106 40 537 539 2
Sales 322 449 127 .40 37 78 41 284 370 86
Clerical 883 850 -33 -.04 86 136 50 796 713 -83
Craft 456 502 46 .10 68 143 75 388 359 29
Semiskill 557 437 -120 -.22 128 216 88 428 220 -208
Transport 108 120 12 .12 9 20 11 98 99 1
Laborers 162 221 59 .36 24 71 47 137 149 12
Household
service 59 36 -23 -.38 10 19 9 48 17 -31
Protective service 39 55 16 .39 1 4 3 37 50 13
Food & food
preparation 175 195 20 .11 28 63 35 147 131 -16
Health service 55 71 16 .30 5 16 11 49 55 6
Janitorial service 85 109 24 .29 12 36 24 72 73 1
Personal service 114 89 -25 -.22 11 18 7 102 71 -1
Farm, forestry,
fisheries 17 53 36 2.10 5 20 15 12 32 20
Total 3,944 4,293 349 0.09 527 1,025 498 3,406 3,258 -148
Occupational Seg ments
Independent 858 1,132 274 .32 93 193 100 765 938 173
Primary
Craft 356 393 37 .10 54 107 53 301 285 -16
Subordinate
Primary 1,688 1,658 -030 -.02 211 354 143 1,477 1,304 -173
Secondary 1,044 1,114 070 .07 175 376 201 869 0737 -132
Total 3,946 4,297 351 .09 533 1,030 497 3,412 3,264 -148
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 and 1980 Public Use Microdata Samples.
After I implemented the shift-share model on the fifteen occupational categories,
several combinations of occupational gains and losses appeared for native and immi-
grant workers. For example, both natives and immigrants gained in employment share
in the managerial and administration occupations but showed losses in the semiskill
occupations. As with the analysis of industrial repositioning, these gains and losses
reflect different instances of native displacement and complementarity that can partially
be attributed to immigrant employment-share gain. Other factors such as occupational
change, each region's general economic climate, and other variables not tested in this
model can also affect both native and immigrant job loss in an occupation.
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Effect of Immigrant Competition Patterns
on Los Angeles Occupations
Number of Occupations
Patterns Whites Blacks Mexicans
Complete Displacement 2 2 1
Partial Displacement 7 3 2
Overall Displacement
Displacement Owing to Other Factors
Complete Complementarity
Native Complementarity Owing to Immigration
Overall Complementarity
Total
Source: My estimates are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1970 PUS (1%) and 1980 PUMS (5%) files.
Note: Totals do not include overall displacement or overall complementarity.
In Los Angeles, the occupations that suffered the severest decline in providing em-
ployment also produced the largest job losses for immigrants and natives. For example,
semiskill occupations experienced the largest job loss — close to 120,000 jobs. Both
immigrant and native employment shares in this occupation were negative and large,
suggesting that job losses are attributable to factors other than job competition between
immigrants and native-born workers. As Table 6 shows, the white population experi-
enced partial displacement in more occupations than the black or Mexican population.
This table then aggregates these patterns into two simple categories of either displace-
ment or complementarity. 58 Los Angeles displayed more instances of complementarity
than displacement for its black and Mexican populations; its white population, however,
experienced more displacement than complementarity. Most whites in most occupations
were partially, not completely, displaced, suggesting that the aggregated overall dis-
placement subcategory is not as fraught with native displacement as its title implies.
In general, Los Angeles immigrants complement natives in occupations more than they
displace them, and displacement, when it occurs, is typically partial.
Shift-Share Model, Four Segments (Test 3)
My final analysis assesses the shift-share model results of four occupation categories
derived from segmentation theory. Data on changes in occupational segment employment
for selected racial and ethnic groups provide a glimpse of the changing employment
composition for each group. The data show that whites were the primary losers of jobs
in the craft, subordinate primary, and secondary segments. However, they gained by
more than 81,000 jobs in the independent primary segment, suggesting that some of




Occupational Segment Shift-Share Model Results for Selected
Ethnic Groups, Los Angeles, 1970-1980
Employment Change Owing to
Inter- Job
Industry active Group Com.
1970 1980 Change Change Effect Size Share Patt.
Groups in Independent Primary
NB White 675,900 756,940 81,040 216,288 81,108 -135,180 -68 PD
NB Black 39,500 85,220 45,720 12,640 45,425 32,785 295 CC
NB Mexican 24,300 49,180 24,880 7,776 24,786 17,010 94 CC
FB Mexican 6,200 30,140 23,940 1,984 23,932 21,948 08
FB Latino 6,200 20,000 13,800 1,984 13,764 11,780 36
FB Asian 8,600 49,180 40,580 2,752 40,506 37,754 74
Groups in Craft
NB White 241,600 204,260 -37,340 24,160 -24,160 -48,320 -13,180 PD
NB Black 26,600 33,580 6,980 2,660 6,916 4,256 64 CC
NB Mexican 21,700 30,480 8,780 2,170 8,680 6,510 100 CC
FB Mexican 12,900 43,920 31,020 1,290 30,960 29,670 60
FB Latino 7,800 15,600 7,800 780 7,800 7,020
FB Asian 3,700 15,020 11,320 370 11,285 10,915 35
Groups in Subord nate Prima ry
NB White 1,173,400 900,700 -272,700 -23,468 -269,882 -246,414 -2,818 PD
NB Black 145,950 196,790 50,840 -2,919 49,623 52,542 1,217 CC
NB Mexican 101,100 125,920 24,820 -2,022 25,275 27,297 455 CD
FB Mexican 45,900 118,830 72,930 -918 72,522 73,440 408
FB Latino 25,150 48,440 23,290 -503 23,138 23,641 152
FB Asian 16,200 69,510 53,310 -324 53,298 53,622 12
Groups in Secondary
NB White 584,800 430,540 -154,260 40,936 -152,048 -192,984 -2,212 PD
NB Black 149,950 148,450 -1,500 10,497 -1,500 -11,997 -1 CC
NB Mexican 93,900 109,400 15,500 6,573 15,024 8,451 476 CC
FB Mexican 73,900 206,370 132,470 5,173 130,803 125,630 1,667
FB Latino 23,450 61,700 38,250 1,642 38,224 36,583 27
FB Asian 13,200 40,590 27,390 924 27,324 26,400 66
Source: My estimates are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 1970 PUS (1%) and 1980 PUMS
(5%) files.
Notes.To maintain consistency with the study emphasis on the native-born labor force, the Job
Competition Pattern column provides data only for the native-born group of each segment.
NB = native-born; FB = foreign-born.
Table 7 presents the shift-share model results for each racial and ethnic group by
occupational segment. These data measure the employment-share gain or loss for each
group and provide some insights into the different job competition patterns described
earlier. On the basis of the shift-share results on the occupational segments, whites were
the only group that experienced instances of displacement as a result of increased immi-
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grant employment share. Both native-born blacks and Mexicans complemented the pres-
ence of immigrants in each of the four segments, except for Mexicans in the subordinate
primary segment. The subordinate primary sector was the only one that experienced a
loss of jobs between 1970 and 1980, making it more vulnerable than the other segments
to instances of job competition.
The job competition patterns for the occupational segments show overwhelmingly
that immigrants played a minimal role in the displacement of native-born groups in each
of the four segments. While whites did lose in each segment, these losses could very
well be the result of their upward mobility into the independent primary segment, a situ-
ation suggested by the data results of the shift-share model. The nonwhite native groups
gained in employment share, suggesting that immigrants do not displace them but rather
complement their employment.
In general, the data indicate that blacks and Mexicans were complemented by
increases in immigration in growing occupations. However, no discernible impact could
be found on whites, blacks, and Mexicans in the occupations that declined— that is,
even in a declining labor market, Los Angeles immigrants were not responsible for
black, white, and Mexican job loss. Thus, Test 2 shows that increases in the occupation-
al employment of immigrants do not lead to displacement of native-born labor. In fact,
this situation arose only for whites in the growth occupations.
Test of this study focused on all the census-defined occupations classified into four
segments. Data show that blacks and native-born Mexicans in the three primary and in
the secondary segment were complemented by the presence of immigrants; that is,
minority workers, with the exception of Mexicans in the subordinate primary segment,
did not lose jobs in the four labor-market segments as a result of increased immigrant
employment. The data also suggest that whites were partially displaced in every seg-
ment. Thus, to the extent that displacement between immigrants and natives is occurring
in Los Angeles, it is primarily relegated to native-born whites, and to a lesser extent,
Mexicans, but only in the subordinate primary. This finding is consistent with earlier
data that showed whites to be the primary victims of occupational-segment job loss
between 1970 and 1980.
Policy Implications
After carefully summarizing the main findings and discussing the hypotheses for each of
the three tests, I conclude that the segmentation/queuing theory best describes what
is occurring in Los Angeles's labor markets. While the results of this study are complex
and many, several major findings are evident. One is that, overall, immigrants are not
displacing native-born labor in disproportionate numbers. Instances are found, however,
of sporadic or isolated job displacement between immigrants and native-born whites
and Mexicans in some occupations and industries. However, the data show that comple-
mentarity is more frequent than displacement and that the white labor force has
decreased significantly owing to factors other than immigration. These two findings
taken together suggest a process of queuing, whereby whites vacate jobs that are filled
by immigrant and minority labor. These findings suggest that immigrants do not con-
tribute to or perpetuate an urban underclass.
The concern over the effects that immigration may have on the employment of
natives, particularly other Latinos and blacks, was of primary interest in this study.
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The job competition question, as argued in the underclass debate, postulates that low-
skilled Latino immigrants may be a closer substitute for low-skilled U.S.-born Latinos
and blacks than for other U.S.-born groups such as women, teenagers, and whites.
As a result, competition in specific labor markets between immigrants and minority
groups may result in the displacement of low-skilled U.S. -born Latinos and blacks, thus
contributing to their already higher-than-average rates of unemployment. This formula-
tion, however, fails to capture the structural attributes and changes that have occurred
in the secondary and primary labor markets and their growth or decline.
Immigration, especially during economic boom periods, is often seen as a positive
economic stimulus. Increased inflows of immigrants during boom and bust times can be
complementary units of production to other nonimmigrant groups, as this research has
shown. As immigration increases, the employment opportunities of U.S.-born workers
also improve because of the rising demand for complementary workers and the
increased demand for goods and services. That the entry of immigrants into local labor
markets has a negligible and, at worst, mixed effect on U.S.-born workers' employment
prospects is echoed by several prominent immigration scholars. 59
Los Angeles Latino immigrants may serve as substitutes for some low-skilled groups
and as complements to other workers. What accounts for some of the sporadic displace-
ment evident in some of the occupations and industries in Los Angeles? It may be that
employers prefer immigrant or other types of workers over black and white workers.
Indeed, Kirshenman and Neckerman, Kirshenman, and Neckerman show that employers
regard black workers, especially males, as more devious, argumentative, intimidating,
and uncooperative than women or immigrants. 60 Employers may be relocating to subur-
ban areas, thus relying on informal recruiting and transportation systems that exclude
black workers from employment. Another good possibility is that employers may be
excluding blacks and whites from jobs in particular industries because they prefer to
hire recent immigrants who are more vulnerable to employer exploitation and not apt to
complain. Because the data in this research suggest that an ethnic succession or job-
queuing process is taking place in Los Angeles, I believe that employers may selectively
choose immigrants over white and some black workers for labor markets in which their
skills are tangible. Because these markets are rare, immigration is not a major contribu-
tor to a black and Latino underclass.
The immigration debate in California and other high immigrant-receiving states has
mostly focused on the immigrant impact on labor supply rather than on structural
problems in the U.S. economy and labor market. The primary concern in this debate is
the cost associated with providing education, health care, welfare services, and em-
ployment to a burgeoning immigrant population, both legal and undocumented. As a
result, policies that deny immigrants a public education, a driver's license, or even
citizenship status for their children have been proposed to curb their flow. These solu-
tions are shortsighted at best because they do not address the fundamental reason
why immigrants come to this country: to work and make better lives for themselves, not
to become dependents of a state.
The misguided Band-Aid policies being debated in California's capitol, rather than
stymieing the movement of immigrants into this country, will have the unintended
effect of further marginalizing a major portion of the population. The net effect of not
providing education and health care to thousands of school-age children and adults
will be an uneducated, unhealthy, and unemployed populace that will, in the long run,
cost dearly. Public policies should instead focus on structural solutions, such as main-
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taining and expanding our industrial job base and increasing employment and training
programs. Additionally, policy analysts and social scientists need to further analyze the
magnitude of and relationship between immigrant and native labor markets.
Present industrial policy or lack thereof serves as a magnet for cheap immigrant
labor. The continued demand for cheap labor not only attracts immigrant labor, legal or
otherwise, but also serves as a catalyst for poor labor-market conditions that in turn are
more conducive to job competition between immigrants and other marginalized workers.
The same industries demanding cheap or immigrant labor also have the largest number
of workplace hazards, low wages and few benefits, and a poor environmental record.
These deficiencies translate into substandard conditions of working poverty, especially
for a family of four in 1992, when the poverty threshold was approximately $14,350.
The burden of impoverishment falls not only on a family or individual but also on the
state in terms of such expenses as future welfare rolls and unemployment benefits.
Industrial policies that increase the minimum wage, favor the employment of native-
born workers and the implementation of a national health care plan will make jobs,
which previously did not provide medical and other benefits, more attractive to U.S.-
born labor. While immigrants will still be attracted to these jobs, knowing that there is a
well-established native labor force will discourage, to some extent, immigration for
work purposes.
Job displacement for California workers, indeed the entire country, is attributable less
to job competition with immigrants than to the massive exodus and closure of firms
that the state suffered in the middle to late 1980s. Los Angeles provides a case in point.
During the 1970s, the area actually showed an expansion in its manufacturing base
when, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Los Angeles accounted for approxi-
mately one-fourth of the net growth in manufacturing jobs for the entire country. By the
1980s, however, the Los Angeles economy, which was highly dependent on its defense
and associated industries, began the rapid decline that persists. Though the area contin-
ues to maintain a readily available and cheap supply of labor, the adoption of somewhat
tougher environmental laws, improved labor standards, and other "hostile" regulations
throughout the state and regional areas such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and the Bay
Area has been blamed for the departure of industries to more "friendly" environments
and even cheaper labor.
Finally, because undocumented immigrants are such a small proportion of the legal
immigrant population— fewer than 14 percent— and an even smaller proportion of the
total population of California - fewer than 4 percent— their negative impact is negligi-
ble or marginal at best. An analysis of several of California's largest revenue-producing
industries, such as agriculture and wine, reveals that the largest number of their employ-
ees are immigrants. These industries are vital to the state's economy and rely on immi-
grant workers because other types of labor are unwilling or unable to work in this area.
Historically, immigrant labor has always been vital to California's growth and economy.
Implementing shortsighted policies that hurt the employability of immigrants will in turn
hamper the contributions they can make to the state's future economy. **•
Notes
1. Job competition is one of several "costs" being argued in the California immigration
debate. Other equally volatile immigration issues such as border patrol enforcement
and undocumented immigration, federal reimbursement to state coffers for federal
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immigration policies, and medical and health benefits to legal and undocumented
immigrants, also at the forefront of the immigration debate, led to California's passage
of Proposition 187. This proposition makes it illegal for undocumented immigrants
and their children to participate in California's publicly funded education system, procure
public health services, except for emergency care, and partake in other government-
sponsored social services.
2. During the late 1980s, poverty rates were much higher than in the 1970s, especially for
African-Americans and Hispanics. For Hispanics, the poverty rate increased from
28 percent to 39 percent between 1972 and 1987; for whites, it was 9.9 percent in 1970,
10.2 percent in 1980, and 10.5 percent in 1987; and for African-Americans, the percent-
ages were 33.5, 32.5, and 33.1, respectively. While the poverty rate for the population
as a whole has been stable around 13 percent since the early 1980s, young families have
experienced a steadily increasing chance of being poor. Whereas one-quarter of those
sixty-five or older had an income below the poverty line in 1970, only one-eighth did
in 1987 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, General Social and
Economic Characteristics, Summary Report, Vol. 1, Chapter C [Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983]).
3. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, poverty has shifted from rural areas to the
inner cities, particularly in New York, Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. In 1960,
28 percent of rural households were poor compared with 13.7 percent in the central
cities and 10 percent in the suburbs. By 1987, the rate had decreased to 14 percent in rural
areas and 6.5 percent in the suburbs but climbed to 15.4 percent in the central cities.
See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, Subject Reports, "Low Income
Areas in Large Cities," PC(2)-9B (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973);
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1980, Subject Reports, "Poverty Areas
in Large Cities," PC-80-2-8D (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989).
4. The term "underclass," used sporadically during the last three decades, was first intro-
duced in this country by Gunnar Myrdal in Challenge to Affluence (New York: Pantheon,
1962), and in his influential "The War on Poverty," The New Republic 150, no. 6 (1964):
14-16. For a thorough historical summary of its origins and varied definitions, see R.
Aponte, "Definitions of the Underclass: A Critical Analysis," Sociology In America, ed.
H. J. Gans (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990).
5. The rate of legal immigration to the United States in the 1980s was among the highest
in its history, surpassed only by the flows of the first two decades of this century.
Immigration during the first eight years of the 1980s averaged 575,000 admissions per
year; the 1980 decennial census, in an estimate by J. Passel and K. Woodward,
"Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by
States," U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984),
enumerated nearly 2 million undocumented immigrants.
6. In the 1960s, nearly two-thirds of the legal immigrants who entered the United States
annually came from Europe and Canada (45 percent and 12 percent, respectively).
In the 1970s, the rate was cut in half; fewer than one-third of the new arrivals came from
European nations and Canada, 28 percent and 3 percent, respectively. See L. Maldonado
and J. Moore, "Urban Ethnicity in the United States: New Immigrants and Old Minorities,"
Urban Affairs Annual Review, 1987, 20. This shift was labeled the "new immigration"
because of the centuries-long monopoly Europe had held on immigration to the United
States. Between 1961 and 1981, legal immigrants from South America, Asia, and Africa
numbered approximately 733,000, compared with 505,000 from Europe. See M. G. Wong,
"Post-1965 Immigrants: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile," in Urban Ethnicity in
the United States: New Immigrants and Old Minorities, edited by L. Maldonado and
J. Moore (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985). Like country-of-origin characteristics, the
composition of immigrant skills also has changed during the past two decades. Borjas,
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employing the Public Use Samples of the 1940, 1960, 1970, and 1980 censuses, shows
that the gap between the skills and labor market — educational attainment, labor-force
participation and unemployment rates, hours worked per year, and hourly wage rates
for immigrants and natives — is growing over time, suggesting that immigrants of earlier
years were more skilled than today's. See G. J. Borjas, Friends or Strangers: The Impact
of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
7. Recent immigrants locate primarily in a few metropolitan cities. In 1980, 40 percent of
immigrant newcomers lived in either New York or Los Angeles. The 1980 census data for
all ten metropolitan areas with the largest new immigrant populations reveal that New
York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago received the largest numbers of documented and
undocumented arrivals from the Third World.
8. Borjas, Friends or Strangers.
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